2013

From Blogger

Professional Privilege in the Administrative Process: a Question of Law of Central Importance to the Legal System?

At last! From the Quebec Court of Appeal, a plausible contender for a general question of law of central importance to the legal system (which, in Canada, is a type of question reserved for the courts and not administrative decision-makers). In Association des pompiers professionnels de Québec inc. c. Québec (Ville de), 2013 QCCA 208, […] Read more

From Blogger

Deference and the Rule of Lenity

In a recent American case, Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc, the question arose whether the rule that ambiguous penal statutes are to be construed in favour of defendants (the “rule of lenity”) could ‘trump’ the rule that courts are to defer to administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutes (Chevron deference).At issue was a regulatory provision preventing […] Read more

From Blogger

Enforcement Discretion: Thinking about the Executive, the Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers

The topic of enforcement discretion is the subject of an interesting series of posts by Zachary Price over at the Volokh Conspiracy. The impetus for Price’s series and his underlying article (“Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty“) comes from several recent American episodes, such as President Obama’s decision not to enforce certain provisions of the Affordable […] Read more

From Blogger

Administrative Remedies and Class Actions

This morning’s Supreme Court of Canada decision in AIC Limited v. Fischer, 2013 SCC 69 involved an application of the “preferable procedure” test for certification of class actions to a case in which the Ontario Securities Commission reached a settlement with mutual fund managers about the controversial practice of “market timing“. The question for the […] Read more

From Blogger

Regulatory Capture and Agency Inaction

There is an interesting piece over at the RegBlog on agency capture and review by America’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of agency inaction. Michael Livermore and Richard Revesz argue that agency failures to act may well result from agency capture and may be as damaging as inefficient agency action resulting from capture. Accordingly, […] Read more